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Abstract
The oil market has often been modeled as an oligopoly where the stra-
tegic players are producers. With climate change, a new sort of game
appeared, where environmental militants play a signiﬁcant role by oppos-
ing some projects, to contain oil production. At the same time, consumers
continue to use increasing amounts of oil, independently of oil price ﬂuc-
tuations. Should we oppose oil projects, reduce demand or both? We
investigate in this paper the double prisoner's dilemma in which indi-
viduals ﬁnd themselves, with respect to oil consumption and their en-
vironmental stance towards the oil industry. We ﬁnd that the collective
outcome of such game is clearly better when a frugal behavior is adopted,
without being militant. The Nash equilibrium, resulting from the indi-
vidual strategies, leads by contrast to the worst possible outcome: high
prices, high consumption and high environmental (negative) impact. An
eﬀective environmental action should avoid opposing oil supply sources (a
costly militant act) and help consumers becoming more frugal.
Keywords: prisonner's dilemma, oil production, militancy, frugality
1 Introduction
A large consensus exists on the necessity to mitigate climate change. A reduc-
tion of CO2 emissions in needed for this to happen, and as 65% of all greenhouse
gases are related to fossil fuel and industrial processesIPCC,2014, fossil fuel con-
sumption has to decline and industrial processes have also to change. Emissions
from the combusion of coal and oil are particularly important IEA,2017. But
∗We want to acknowledge the useful comments of two referees.
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Figure 1: World oil production and price, 2002-2018 EIA,2018
while coal consumption, and coal-related emissions, have peaked in 2014, oil
consumption continues to grow. So does oil production, as consumption and
production follow each other very closely - with only short term stocks and
strategic reserves creating a diﬀerence. As illustrated in Figure 1, oil produc-
tion is on an almost linearly increasing path, from about 80 millions barrels per
day in 2002 to close to 100 millions barrels per day in 2018 EIA,2018. Oil prices,
perhaps surprisingly, have no apparant impact on consumption and production.
Indeed, despite large swings in oil prices in the 2002-2018 period, from $28 to
$134 per barrel of Western Texas Intermediate (WTI), oil demand and produc-
tion continued their steady growth. This translates in very inelastic measures
of the price elasticity of oil and oil products demands (usually around -0.2), as
many econometric studies conclude. See for instance Labandeira,2017.
While high oil prices have not discouraged consumers to use oil, environmental
militants have been very active to oppose oil projects. Movements such as Keep
It in the Ground try to revoke the social license of the fossil fuel industry and
ﬁght iconic battles against fossil fuel infrastructure 350.org,2018. Their hope
is that by opposing oil development, hence by limiting supply, consumption will
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go down, and so would emissions. Climate change would consequently be mit-
igated. Some fossil fuel infrastructure can indeed be abandoned by promoters
after a successful opposition. In Canada, for instance, strong opposition to
some major oil pipeline projects (Energy East and TransMountain) has pushed
their promoters to renounce developing them.
Despite such opposition, however, oil consumption has not decreased. It is
supply that has been aﬀected: some oil projects are removed from the supply
mix, and more expensive ones are selected. While it's impossible to directly
link the cancellation of one project to the development of another, one could
easily conjecture that when oil investments are not made in, for instance, Al-
berta (Canada), because of some strong local opposition, it will lead to some
equivalent investments made in the United States, Brazil, Iraq or Libya, where
oil production can grow and is growing (see for instance IEA,2018, for some
current numbers and forecasts). In short, oil production does not decline after
some oil project opposition, but marginally more expensive projects, with less
opposition, are chosen. See Herﬁndahl,1967 and the subsequent literature on
the order of extraction of an exhaustible resource. Such price increase indirectly
makes renewable energy more competitive. However, so far new renewable en-
ergy sources (such as wind or solar) are added to the global production mix,
especially in electricity generation, but aren't substitute to oil in the transport-
ation sector, where most of the oil is consumed.
In many cases, when environmental militants oppose oil projects, they do
not directly call for a lower oil consumption from individuals. Greenpeace In-
ternational, for instance, asks its website visitors to Join the wave of resistance
against pipelines, but does not advice to use less oil products, to question
friends about their vehicule choice or to adopt a frugal energy consumption
level (see Greenpeace International,2018). Maybe they assume that display-
ing resistance is more self-satisfying than not, while reducing oil consumption
is too individually demanding. Could it therefore be a better strategy to be
an environmental militant than to adopt (and possibly promote) a frugal life-
style? Of course, the two are separate decisions and can be done simultaneously.
But given the price inelasticity of oil demand, as illustrated before, supply side
strategies of environmental militants may not have the intended results.
This paper belongs to the family of papers dealing with pollution challenges
within a game theoretic framework, to which Georges Zaccour has signiﬁcantly
contributed. See for instance Petrosjan and Zaccour (2003), Breton, Sbragia and
Zaccour (2010) or Jørgensen, Martín-Herrán and Zaccour (2010), among many
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others. Our paper also considers the action of the civil society (or environmental
groups) in the absence of a central authority, where strategic choices can be made
to the beneﬁt, or detriment, of all, as in Ngendakuriyo and Zaccour (2017), which
focuses on corruption. Contrary to these papers, however, we limit ourselves to
a static context.
More speciﬁcally, this paper attempts to disentangle the diﬀerent aspects
related to our speciﬁc situation. Given the two sets of choices mentioned above,
being an environmental militant or not and adopting a frugal level of energy
consumption or not, what are the invidual and collective outcomes? What
are the environmental impacts of these choices, but also the price and welfare
impacts?
We oﬀer some answers to these questions, by studying the strategic situations
related to the two sets of choices. In both cases, individuals face a prisoner's
dilemma: they would be better oﬀ with a lower consumption level (because of
the global environmental impact) and no opposition to oil projects (because
of the lower prices), only if all did the same. But gratiﬁcation from higher
consumption and adopting a militant environmental stance creates incentives
to defect.
While we make some simplifying assumptions, notably that oil demand is
strictly price-inelastic, our analysis shows that welfare gains come from lower
consumption levels. Militancy can be costly and beneﬁt the oil industry in
ways that may not be fully understood by oil projects opponents. However, the
assumption on price-elasticity is made for the sake of clarity in the exposition,
but would not change the main results if relaxed.
We present the model in the next section, the individual strategies and the
market equilibirum. Then we investigate the four polar collective outcomes of
the game, and compare their price, quantity (equivalent to the environmental
impact) and welfare levels.
2 The model
Consider a population with N identical individuals endowed with a utility
U (q, s; p,Q) = v (p, q) + b (s)− e (Q) ,
where v (p, q) stands for the net utility from individual consumption q at price
p, b (s) stands for the beneﬁts from environmental stance s and e (Q) for the
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individual environmental costs, a function of total consumption Q.
Individual consumption q can be either average or frugal: q ∈ {a; f}. Envir-
onmental stance is either militant or not : s ∈ {m; /O} . Collective consumption
Q is determined by the interplay of supply and demand.
2.1 The game in individual strategies
Let N be the total number of players and denote by Nf and Nm the number of
frugals and the number of militants. The market equilibrium depends upon the
individual strategies of all players. We denote respectively by p∗ = p (Nf , Nm)
and Q∗ = Q (Nf , Nm) the equilibrium price and quantity outcomes. As we
shall see  and as expected  Q∗ = Q (Nf , Nm) is non-increasing in both its
arguments.
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. In regard of their environmental impact, individuals ﬁnd it
individually too costly to adopt a frugal behaviour :
U (f, s,Q (Nf ;Nm)) < U (a, s,Q (Nf − 1;Nm)) ,
for all Nf ∈ J1;NK and whatever the values of s ∈ {m; /O} and Nm ∈ J0;NK .
Assumption 2. Individuals ﬁnd it individually proﬁtable to adopt a stance of
environmental militant:
U (q,m,Q (Nf ;Nm)) > U
(
q, /O,Q (Nf ;Nm − 1)
)
,
for all Nm ∈ J1;NK and whatever the values of q ∈ {a; f} and Nf ∈ J0;NK .
Assumption 3. It would be collectively rational to adopt a frugal behaviour:
U (f, s,Q (N ;Nm)) > U (a, s,Q (0;Nm)) ,
whatever the values of s ∈ {m; /O} and Nm ∈ J0;NK .
Given these assumptions it is clear that:
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Lemma. The dominant individual strategies are
(q; s) = (a,m) .
2.2 The market equilibrium
As mentioned in the introduction, demand is pretty insensitive to prices. We
assume that total demand D thus depends only upon the number of frugals, so
that
D (Nf ) = qa (N −Nf ) + qfNf ,
where qa > qf . On the supply side, price matters. Moreover, it is directly
impacted by militancy. Again, for simplicity we suppose that:
S (p,Nm) = sup
{
0;β
[
p− (p+ cNm)]} ,
where β is the positive slope of the supply curve, p is the minimum price at which
production can take place with no militancy, and c is the individual impact of
militancy on such minimum price.
We assume competitive markets. By deﬁnition, at equilibrium D = S so
that the equilibrium price is given by
p (Nf , Nm) = p+ cNm + β
−1 [qa (N −Nf ) + qfNf ]
= p+ β−1Nqa − β−1 (qa − qf )Nf + cNm. (1)
This says that the price increases with the number of militants, Nm, but de-
creases with the number of frugals, Nf . By contrast, the equilibrium quantity
is a function of the number of frugals only:1
Q (Nf , Nm) = qaN − (qa − qf )Nf , (2)
≡ Q (Nf ) .
In words, the number of militants has an impact only on price (hence on consum-
mer welfare) but not on equilibrium demand - hence upon the environmental
impact.
1This is a direct consequence of the assumption on demand inelasticity.
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2.3 Discussion
2.3.1 Individual cost of militancy
Coming back to Assumption 2 upon the payoﬀ of militancy, we assumed that
b (m)− b (/O) > v (p (Nf ;Nm − 1) , q)− v (p (Nf ;Nm) , q) .
Decomposing the net utility into gross utility net of spendings (that is substi-
tuting w (q)− pq to v (p, q)) this amounts to:
b (m)− b (/O) > [p (Nf ;Nm)− p (Nf ;Nm − 1)] q. (3)
This means that the monetary costs (through the price impact) to the consumers
of their militancy cannot counterweight the beneﬁts from their environmental
stance. This is fully consistent with the (negligible) price inelasticity of their
individual demand.
2.3.2 Impact on the oil industry
Yet militancy increases consumer ﬁnancial burden which directly proﬁts the
industry. In fact, for any Nf , hence for any given level of total demand, the
industry revenues R are an increasing function of the number of militants:
R (Nf ;Nm) = p (Nf ;Nm)Q (Nf )
= R (Nf ; 0) + cNmQ (Nf ) ,
from equations (1) and (2). Paradoxically, therefore, militancy is beneﬁcial to
the oil industry, except of course for those producers who have been excluded
from the market. In fact, by reducing total supply, militancy is akin to the
action of an oil cartel. The main diﬀerence is that the production reduction is
not evenly shared by all producers, but obtained by excluding some speciﬁc oil
production sites.
2.3.3 Social costs of militancy
While the individual costs of militancy is smaller than its individual beneﬁts
(see equation (3)), it is also borne by everyone, through the price increase it
triggers. We assume that the individual (psychological) beneﬁts from taking a
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Figure 2: The four polar collective outcomes: Individually rational (IR), Un-
concerned (U), Cooperative (C) and Radical environmentalist (RE).
When militants manage for the projects associated to the grey area to be can-
celled, the subsequent supply curve is shifted to the left.
militant environmental stance are smaller than the ﬁnancial costs it imposes on
all consumers. Formally
Assumption 4. Individual (psychological) beneﬁts from taking a militant envir-
onmental stance are smaller than the ﬁnancial costs it imposes on all consumers.
b (m)− b (/O) < [p (Nf ;Nm)− p (Nf ;Nm − 1)]Q (Nf ) ,
for any Nm ≥ 1 and any Nf .
3 Collective outcomes
We now consider the collective outcomes of the strategic game. There is a
double prisoner's dilemma, one in each of the strategic variables q ∈ {a, f} and
s ∈ {m, /O}. We identify four polar collective outcomes.
3.1 Four polar collective outcomes
Let Q = qaN and Q = qfN .
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3.1.1 Individually rational outcome
As already mentioned in Lemma 2.1, it is a dominant strategy for individuals
to be an average consumer and a militant. Therefore, the individually rational
outcome is (Nf ;Nm) = (0, N) and
QIR = Q, pIR = p+ β−1Q+ cN
so that
U IR = w (qa)− pIRqa + b (m)− e
(
Q
)
.
3.1.2 Cooperative outcome
If players were to cooperate, they would be frugal and abstain from militancy.
Therefore, the cooperative outcome is (Nf ;Nm) = (N, 0) and
QC = Q pC = p+ β−1Q
so that
U C = w (qf )− pCqf + b
(
/O
)− e (Q) .
3.1.3 Outcome of an unconcerned population
If consumers are unconcerned so that they all maintain an average consump-
tion and do not bother to take a militant position, the collective outcome is
(Nf ;Nm) = (0, 0) and
QU = Q pU = p+ β−1Q
so that
U U = w (qa)− pUqa + b
(
/O
)− e (Q) .
3.1.4 Outcome of a radical environmentalist population
If individuals are all frugal and engaged in militancy, despite its costs, then
(Nf ;Nm) = (N,N) and
QRE = Q pRE = p+ β−1Q+ cN
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so that
U RE = w (qf )− pREqf + b (m)− e
(
Q
)
.
3.2 Discussion
3.2.1 Quantity and price comparisons
In terms of quantities, hence environmental impact, the comparison between
the four cases is pretty straightforward:
QRE = QC = Q < Q = QU = QIR.
There are also simple comparisons between some prices:
pRE < pIR and pC < pU ;
pC < pRE and pU < pIR;
Hence pC < pIR. However, the comparison pRE and pU is a priori ambiguous.
The diﬀerence between both prices depends upon the elasticity of supply
and the diﬀerence between the average and frugal demands. More precisely,
pRE − pU = cN − β−1 (QU −QRE) = [c− β−1 (qa − qf )]N.
In words, the price will be higher with a population of RadicalEnvironmentalists
than with an Unconcerned population if (and only if), the sole impact of their
own militancy upon the equilibrium price is suﬃcient to induce individuals to
reduce their demand by a larger amount than that associated to shifting from
average to frugal consumption. In all other cases, that is when
βc < qa − qf , (4)
we have pRE < pU . It is thus fair to assume that
pC < pRE ≤ pU < pIR.
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3.2.2 Welfare comparisons
In terms of welfare, the pairwise comparison of the four polar outcomes is less
straightforward. We have
U IR −U RE = [w (qa)− pIRqa + b (m)− e (Q)]− [w (qf )− pREqf + b (m)− e (Q)]
=
[
w (qa)− pIRqa
]− [w (qf )− pREqf ]− [e (Q)− e (Q)] .
By Assumption 3 upon the collective rationality of frugal behaviour
v (p (0;Nm) , a)−v (p (N ;Nm) , f) < e [Q (0;Nm)]−e [Q (N ;Nm)] = e
(
Q
)−e (Q) ,
so that, substituting w (q)− pq to v (p, q)we have:
[w (qa)− p (0;Nm) qa]− [w (qf )− p (N ;Nm) qf ] < e
(
Q
)− e (Q) ,
for any Nm. Let Nm = N. We have p (0;N) = p
IR and p (N ;N) = pRE so that
we can conclude:
U IR −U RE < 0.
Moreover, Assumption 4 on the social cost of militancy says that
b (m)− b (/O) < [p (Nf ;Nm)− p (Nf ;Nm − 1)]Q (Nf ) = cQ (Nf )
which implies that b (m) − b (/O) < [p (Nf ;N)− p (Nf ; 0)]Q (Nf ) . What is of
more interest is that, for Nf = 0 and Nf = N it also states
b (m)− b (/O) < [p (0;Nm)− p (0;Nm − 1)] qaN = cNqa,
b (m)− b (/O) < [p (N ;Nm)− p (N ;Nm − 1)] qfN = cNqf .
As a consequence, we also have
U IR −U U = [w (qa)− pIRqa + b (m)− e (Q)]− [w (qa)− pUqa + b (/O)− e (Q)]
=
[
b (m)− b (/O)]− (pIR − pU) qa
=
[
b (m)− b (/O)]− cNqa
< 0,
from Assumption 2.
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Similarly, we have
U RE −U C = [w (qf )− pREqf + b (m)− e (Q)]− [w (qf )− pCqf + b (/O)− e (Q)]
=
[
b (m)− b (/O)]− (pRE − pC) qf
=
[
b (m)− b (/O)]− cNqf
< 0,
again from Assumption 2.
We now compare U U to both U RE and U C .
We have
U U −U C = [w (qa)− pUqa + b (/O)− e (Q)]− [w (qf )− pCqf + b (/O)− e (Q)]
=
[
w (qa)− pUqa
]− [w (qf )− pCqf ]− [e (Q)− e (Q)] .
Assumption 3 upon the collective rationality of frugal behaviour implies that
e
(
Q
)− e (Q) > [w (qa)− pUqa]− [w (qf )− pCqf ] ,
so that we obtain
U U −U C < 0.
Finally
U U −U RE = [w (qa)− pUqa + b (/O)− e (Q)]− [w (qf )− pREqf + b (m)− e (Q)]
=
[
w (qa)− pUqa
]− [w (qf )− pREqf ]− [b (m)− b (/O)]− [e (Q)− e (Q)] .
Observe that pRE = p+ β−1Q+ cN = pC + cN. It follows that
U U −U RE = {cNqf − [b (m)− b (/O)]}
− {[e (Q)− e (Q)]− [(w (qa)− pUqa)− w (qf )− pCqf ]}
where from Assumption 3 upon the collective rationality of frugal behaviour
and from Assumption 4 upon the social cost of militancy,
e
(
Q
)− e (Q) > [w (qa)− pUqa]− [w (qf )− pCqf ] ,
cNqf > b (m)− b
(
/O
)
so that both terms are positive and the sign of U U −U RE is indeterminate. It
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depends upon the relative magnitude of the costs of militancy and the environ-
mental costs. If the latter dominates, U RE > U U , the converse otherwise.
To summarize
U IR < U RE < U C ,
U IR < U U < U C .
4 Conclusion
The double prisoner's dilemma leads, unsurprisingly, to the worst welfare out-
come. Demand policies, targeting individual behaviours, or simply individual
action to reduce demand, are more eﬀective than supply strategies to improve
environmental outcomes. Supply strategies are not only ineﬀective but are be-
neﬁcial to the industry by raising its revenues. This is deﬁnitely something most
environmental militants do not intend.
This paper is a ﬁrst step toward the analysis of the eﬀects of militancy on oil
markets. Further developments could include the assessment of the impact of
some elasticity in oil demand on the these results and the study of distributional
eﬀects of oil price increases induced by militancy. Indeed, many lower income
oil consumers already spend a higher percentage of their income on energy, des-
pite using less of it, than higher income ones. They bear a greater cost when
oil becomes more expensive and could be collateral victims of environmental
militancy. On the other hand, if higher income consumers became more frugal,
it would provide both ﬁnancial and environmental relief to everyone - but espe-
cially for the poorest, who are often, also, the most exposed to environmental
problems.
References
[1] Breton B., Sbragia L. and Zaccour G. (2010) A Dynamic Model for In-
ternational Environmental Agreements, Environmental and Resource Eco-
nomics, vol. 45 (1) pp. 2548.
[2] EIA (2018) International Data. Washington DC: Energy Information Ad-
ministration.
13
[3] Greenpeace International (2018) Act. Amsterdam: Green-
peace International. Web page accessed on July 18, 2018. ht-
tps://www.greenpeace.org/international/act/
[4] Herﬁndahl, O. C. (1967) Depletion and Economic Theory, in: M. M.
Gaﬀney (ed.), Extractive Resources and Taxation, Wisconsin University
Press, Madison, WI, pp. 6369.
[5] IEA (2017) Key world energy statistics. International Energy Agency:
Paris.
[6] IEA (2018) Oil Market Report 2018. International Energy Agency: Paris.
[7] IPCC (2014) Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contri-
bution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga,
Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S.
Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von
Stechow, T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
[8] Jørgensen S., Martín-Herrán G. and Zaccour G. (2010) Dynamic games in
the economics and management of pollution, Environmental Modeling &
Assessment 15 (6), pp. 433-467.
[9] Labandeira X., Lageaga J.M. and Lopez-Otero X. (2017), A meta-analysis
on the price elasticity of energy demand, Energy Policy, 102 : 549-68.
[10] Ngendakuriyo F. and Zaccour, G. (2017) Should civil society organizations
cooperate or compete in ﬁghting a corrupt government?, Mathematical
Social Sciences, vol. 85, pp. 30-36.
[11] Petrosjan L. and Zaccour G. (2003) Time-consistent Shapley value alloca-
tion of pollution cost reduction, Journal of economic dynamics and control,
vol. 27 (3), pp. 381-398.
[12] 350.org (2018) About 350. New York: 350.org. Web page accessed on July
18, 2018. https://350.org/about/
14
